Abstract. In this paper, we introduce a new class of double-block-length hash functions. Using the ideal cipher model, we prove that these hash functions, dubbed MJH, are asymptotically collision resistant up to O(2 n(1− ) ) query complexity for any > 0 in the iteration, where n is the block size of the underlying blockcipher. When based on n-bit key blockciphers, our construction, being of rate 1/2, provides better provable security than MDC-2, the only known construction of a rate-1/2 double-length hash function based on an n-bit key blockcipher with non-trivial provable security. Moreover, since key scheduling is performed only once per message block for MJH, our proposal significantly outperforms MDC-2 in efficiency. When based on a 2n-bit key blockcipher, we can use the extra n bits of key to increase the amount of payload accordingly. Thus we get a rate-1 hash function that is much faster than existing proposals, such as Tandem-DM with comparable provable security. This is the full version of [19] .
Introduction
A cryptographic hash function takes a message of arbitrary length, and returns a bit string of fixed length. The most common way of hashing variable length messages is to iterate a fixed-size compression function according to the Merkle-Damgård paradigm [7, 23] . The underlying compression function can either be constructed from scratch, or be built upon off-the-shelf cryptographic primitives such as blockciphers. In this work, we will focus on blockcipher-based construction as one of the widely studied approaches [1, 2, 10-13, 16, 25-33] . By instantiating a blockcipher-based construction with an extensively studied blockcipher, one can conveniently transfer the trust in the existing blockcipher to the hash function. This approach is particularly useful in highly constrained environments such as RFID systems, since a single implementation of a blockcipher can be used for both a blockcipher and a hash function. Compared to blockcipher-based hash functions, most dedicated hash functions require significant amounts of state and the operations in their designs are not always as hardware friendly [3] .
One might want to construct a blockcipher-based hash function using a 2n-to-n bit compression function that makes a certain number of calls to an n-bit blockcipher. However, such a function, called a single-block-length (SBL) compression function, might be vulnerable to collision attacks due to its short output length. For example, one could successfully mount a birthday attack on a compression function based on AES-128 using approximately 2 64 queries. Based on DES, the threshold number of queries would be reduced to 2 32 . This observation motivated substantial research on double-block-length (DBL) hash functions, where the output length is twice the block length of the underlying blockcipher(s).
An important distinction can be made on whether the underlying n-bit blockcipher has n-bit or 2n-bit keys. Whereas for the latter scenario several proposals with good provable security are known, the construction of a double-length hash function based on an n-bit-key blockcipher remains elusive (see also the related works section). Currently the only known candidate providing both efficiency and a reasonable level of provable security is MDC-2 [6, 24] , which makes two calls to an n-bit key blockcipher to compress a single message block (thus its rate, the ratio of message blocks hashed per blockcipher calls, equals 1/2). In 2007, 20 years after its original proposal, Steinberger was the first to provide a non-trivial bound on the collision resistance of MDC-2 in the ideal cipher model [33] . In particular, he showed that an adversary asking fewer than 2 3n/5− queries (for any fixed > 0) has only a negligible chance of finding a collision. The best attack against MDC-2 however still requires Ω(2 n−log n ) queries [15] , leaving a considerable gap between the upper and lower bounds for its security.
Our contribution. We propose a new construction, dubbed MJH, that significantly outperforms MDC-2 both in terms of efficiency and what can currently be proven about it. Figures 1(a) and 1(b) depict our proposed compression function and the MDC-2 compression function, respectively. A formal definition of MJH will follow in Section 3.1. From a high level, we first construct a 2n-bit to 2n-bit function by concatenating the output of two parallel blockcipher calls run in Davies-Meyer mode. Here we use Hirose's trick [13] of an involution without fixed points to achieve implicit domain separation so we can use the same blockcipher for both strains. The resulting, reasonably random looking function is subsequently used as primitive for the JH construction [34] , creating a (3n + c)-bit to 2n-bit compression function and iterating it using the Merkle-Damgård transform to obtain a hash function.
Efficiency comparison. Per message block, the MJH construction makes two calls to a blockcipher with the same key. In addition, there are four n-bit xors (since the last two xors on the right strain can be merged) and the operations σ and θ. For the involution σ it suffices to toggle a single bit. The multiplication by the nonzero constant θ can be efficiently implemented by an n-bit wise shift (corresponding to multiplication by x in polynomial representation of the field) followed by a conditional xor of a mask (corresponding to reduction modulo the minimal polynomial).
MDC-2 on the other hand has two calls to a blockcipher with distinct keys, but it only needs two n-bit xors and a swap to complete evaluation of the compression function. Depending on platform and implementation (and without AES instruction set), AES-128 key scheduling takes up around 25% to 35% (of the cycles) of a single call to the blockcipher. This translates into a speedup of about 10% to 15% of MJH over MDC-2 (the extra key-schedule processing is not an issue here). We also note that due to recent related-key attacks [5] future blockciphers can be expected to have key scheduling algorithms that are even costlier than current ones; this would tilt the balance even further in our advantage.
Recently, Bos,Özen and Stam [4] provided a software benchmark for a large range of 256-bit blockcipher-based hash functions. With the underlying blockcipher instantiated with AES, MJH turned out to the fastest one among the existing schemes.
On hardware we obtain an advantage if the blockciphers are implemented twice (to increase throughput) since the key scheduling circuit can be shared. Our construction does need an extra feedforward in comparison to MDC-2 (2 vs. 1), which is a disadvantage posing memory constraints on the hardware circuit [3] .
Security results. In the ideal cipher model, we prove that our MJH hash functions are collision resistant up to O(2 n(1− ) ) query complexity for any > 0 in the iteration, improving over the bound O(2 2n 3 −log n ) given in [19] . Like prior works dealing with collision resistance in the iteration [22, 32] , in the proof we consider a graph whose nodes correspond to chaining variables and where edges are drawn whenever an adversary has asked the "correct" queries to connect two chaining variables.
As a first observation, note that queries to the blockcipher are paired by the involution σ (just as in Hirose's scheme); we will call such a pair a query-response cycle. A challenge presents itself in that any query-response cycle typically adds 2 n+1 edges to the graph due to the JH structure. Our core observation is that any pair of query-response cycles can only be connected in four possible ways (the use of σ introduces the not-quite-uniqueness), which in turn allows us to put even more stringent bounds on the number of chains of connected query-response cycles. This suffices to bound the probability of the adversary connecting two largish components in the graph; bounding the probability of actually constructing a collision still involves a considerable amount of additional case analysis.
Asymptotically almost optimal, our bound is the best one known for rate-1/2 n-bit key blockcipher based DBL hash functions. However, we note that our security bound is rather theoretical, since a large constant is hidden in the query complexity O(2 n(1− ) ). For this reason, for practical parameters, say n = 128, our result guarantees only 81-bit security, still far from optimal. Nevertheless, this is better than Steinberger's bound for MDC-2. See Table 2 in Section 3.6 for numerical comparison in detail.
Our analysis of MJH also opens up the possibility to get comparable bounds for JH itself. To the best of our knowledge, currently the best (published) bounds for JH appeared in [17] showing collision resistance up to roughly 2 n/4 queries (where n is the internal JH state size), whereas a straightforward mapping of our bounds would get closer to 2 n/2 . Unfortunately, for JH itself dealing with inverse (permutation) queries creates difficulties that we could avoid for MJH (by internally using Davies-Meyer, which would be meaningless for JH).
Related work. While many DBL compression functions of rate-1 have been proposed, unfortunately it turned out that a large class do not provide security in terms of collision resistance and preimage resistance beyond that already offered by single-block-length constructions [10, 11, 14] . This holds true both for constructions based on blockciphers with n-bit keys or 2n-bit keys.
In the latter category, Lucks recently proposed the first DBL hash function of rate-1 with (almost) optimal security in the iteration [22, 25] . Later, an alternative rate-1 secure DBL compression function was given by Stam [32] and generalized by Lee and Steinberger [20] . However, both constructions use full finite field multiplications, significantly degrading their efficiency.
Classical DBL compression functions of rate below 1 include MDC-2, MDC-4, Tandem-DM and Abreast-DM [6, 16] . We have already discussed MDC-2 and the remarkable results obtained by Steinberger [33] . MDC-4 also uses an n-bit key blockcipher, but it is twice as inefficient.
Both Tandem-DM and Abreast-DM [6, 16] are rate-1/2 hash functions based on a blockcipher with 2n-bit key. The main challenge providing a proof is the fact that the same blockcipher is called twice, but recently Lee, Stam, and Steinberger [21] proved the security of Tandem-DM (correcting [8] ). As in the case of MDC-2, the security bound obtained is parameterized: optimizing the parameter gives collision resistance of Tandem-DM up to the birthday bound. The collision resistance of Abreast-DM was independently proved in [9] and [18] .
While the design of hash functions based on 2n-bit key blockciphers is considerably easier than that based on n-bit key blockciphers, the former-while more robust with respect to for instance preimage resistance-are typically less efficient even at the same "rate". Indeed, a blockcipher with 2n-bit keys is required to provide 2n-bit security as opposed to n-bit security for the smaller n-bit key blockcipher. For example, AES-256 consists of 14 rounds, 4 rounds more than AES-128. So as a first rough estimate (ignoring key scheduling) one expects AES-256 to be about 40% slower than AES-128. As an aside, AES-256 no longer guarantees a sufficient level of security due to the recent related-key attacks by Biryukov and Khovratovich [5] .
Preliminaries
General notation. Let F 2 n denote a finite field of order 2 n . Throughout our work, we will identify F 2 n and {0, 1} n , assuming a fixed mapping between the two sets. For two bitstrings x and y, x||y denotes the concatenation of x and y. For a bitstring x ∈ {0, 1} 2n , x L and x R denote the unique n-bit strings such that x = x L ||x R .
The ideal cipher model. For positive integers κ and n, let BC(κ, n) be the set of all blockciphers with n-bit blocks and κ-bit keys. In the ideal cipher model, a (κ, n)-blockcipher E is chosen from BC(κ, n) uniformly at random. It allows for two types of oracle queries E(K, X) and E −1 (K, Y ) for X, Y ∈ {0, 1} n and K ∈ {0, 1} κ . The response to an inverse query E −1 (K, Y ) is X ∈ {0, 1} n such that E(K, X) = Y . Here, X, Y and K are called plaintext, ciphertext, and key, respectively. In this paper, we assume κ = n + c for some c ≥ 0.
The Merkle-Damgård transform. For convenience, we recall the Merkle-Damgård transform as it will be applied to our (double-block-length) construction. Let pad : {0, 1} * → ∞ i=1 {0, 1} κi be an injective padding. With this padding scheme and a predetermined constant IV ∈ {0, 1} 2n , the Merkle-Damgård transform produces a variable-input-length function
Collision resistance. We review the definition of collision resistance in the information-theoretic model. Given a function H = H[P] and an IT adversary A both with oracle access to an ideal primitive P, the collision resistance of H against A is estimated by the Exp coll H (A) experiment.
Experiment Exp
This experiment records every query-response pair that A obtains by oracle queries into a query history Q. We write u = H Q (M ) if Q contains all the query-response pairs required to compute u = H(M ). At the end of the experiment, A would like to find two distinct evaluations yielding a collision. The collision-finding advantage of A is defined to be
The probability is taken over the random choice of P and A's coins (if any). For q > 0, we define Adv coll H (q) as the maximum of Adv coll H (A) over all adversaries A making at mostueries.
The MJH Hash Functions and their Collision Resistance

The MJH Construction
For c ≥ 0, let E be an (n + c)-bit key blockciphers in BC(n + c, n). Let σ be an involution on {0, 1} n with no fixed point, and let θ = 0, 1 be a constant in Figure 1 Since the padding is injective, we can simplify our collision analysis by assuming that the domain of a MJH hash function is ∞ i=1 {0, 1} (n+c)i (and ignore the padding scheme).
Query-Response Cycles and a Modified Adversary
Let H = H[σ, θ] be the MJH hash function defined by (σ, θ), and let A be an information-theoretic adversary with oracle access to E and E −1 . Note that A records a triple (X, K, Y ) into the query history Q if A asks for E(K, X) and gets back Y , or if it asks for E −1 (K, Y ) and gets back X. Since σ is an involution, it holds that X σ = σ(X) iff X = σ(X σ ). In other words, σ induces a natural way to pair queries: for (X, K, Y ) and (X σ , K, Y σ ) in Q with X σ = σ(X) we call
a query-response cycle (or simply a cycle) and the corresponding queries each other's conjugates.
We can now transform A into an adversary B that records its query history Q ∆ in terms of query-response cycles as described in Figure 2 . If A makes at mostueries, then the corresponding adversary B makes at most 2q queries, and records at mostuery-response cycles. Since
Return the response using query history Q∆ it suffices to consider the security of H against a modified adversary that records exactlyueryresponse cycles. Henceforth, the i-th query-response cycle is denoted
Additionally, we will write N = 2 n and N = N − 2q assuming N > N/2.
Graph Representation of the Adversary's Endeavors
Each query-response cycle
and
for z ∈ {0, 1} n . We now define a directed graph G on {0, 1} 2n where the nodes correspond to chaining variables and edges are added depending on the evaluations of G[σ, θ] the adversary can make given the available query-response cycles. In other words, a directed edge from u to v labeled i is added to G when the i-th query-response cycle determines an evaluation G[σ, θ](u, z||z ) = v for some z ∈ {0, 1} n and z ∈ {0, 1} c . Such a connection is denoted by u i → v. More specifically, we write u
. This property will be frequently used in the following analysis.
A path P is a subgraph of G of the form
where l ≥ 0, i 1 , . . . , i l ∈ [1, q] and δ 1 , . . . , δ l ∈ {+, −}. 3 The nonnegative integer l is called the length of P, and denoted by |P|. Node u[0] is the start node of P, denoted by s(P). Node u[l] is the end node of P, denoted by e(P).
We say two paths P :
are colliding if e(P) = e(P ) and ((i 1 , δ 1 ), . . . , (i s , δ s )) = ((i 1 , δ 1 ), . . . , (i t , δ t )). Furthermore, the colliding paths P and P are called irreducible if (i s , δ s ) = (i t , δ t ).
Decomposing a Collision
Let Coll denote the event that B makes a collision of H. For a fixed parameter l ≥ 2, we can decompose the event Coll as follows. Proposition 1. Let C i , i = 0, 1, 2, 3, be events(configurations) defined as follows (see also Fig. 3 ).
and u = e(P 2 ) for some path P 2 ∈ G such that |P 2 | < l.
Proof. Suppose that the i-th query-response cycle ∆ i of B completes a collision of H on a certain node w. Then, for some positive integers s and t, there would exist irreducible colliding paths
in P has a tail of length l if either (α ≥ l and j α−l+1 , j α−l+2 , . . . , j α < i) or (α < l and j 1 , j 2 , . . . , j α < i). This type of i-labeled edges are similarly defined for P . Note that the i-labeled edge nearest IV (in any path) has a tail of length l.
Suppose that P contains an i-labeled edge. Among the i-labeled edges with a tail of length l in P, choose the nearest one, say u i → v, to the colliding node w and look at the configuration around this edge. If there is another i-labeled edge between v and w, then we will see configuration C 2 . Otherwise, we will see configuration either C 1 or C 3 around u i → v without the occurrence of C 0 . In particular, we can assume |P 2 | ≤ |P 3 | in C 3 . Otherwise, we can look at the i-labeled edges with a tail of length l in P and find the nearest one to the colliding node. 
← IV for some u ∈ R and j < i,
← IV for some u ∈ R and j, j < i,
→ IV for some u ∈ R and j, j < i,
← v for some u ∈ R and j, j , j < i,
→ v for some u ∈ R and j, j , j < i,
→ v for some u ∈ R and j < i,
← v for some u ∈ R and j < i,
← v for some u ∈ R and j, j < i,
The
, according to the path lengths.
In order to upper bound the probability of the events C 1 , C 2 and C 3 in the general case, we need to define certain auxiliary subsets of {0, 1} 2n .
1. For w ∈ {0, 1} 2n , z 1 , z 2 ∈ {0, 1} n and k ≥ 0,
3. For z ∈ {0, 1} n and k 1 , k 2 ≥ 0,
By symmetry, we have V 1
for any z ∈ {0, 1} n . Pictorial illustration of the auxiliary subsets is given in Fig 4. In terms of the auxiliary subsets, we can restate events C 1 , C 2 and C 3 as follows.
Proposition 2. Let C * 1 , C * 2 and C * 3 be events defined as follows. (a) either w ∈ V 1
Proof. If an i-labeled edge completes a configuration C α , α = 1, 2, 3, with
. Suppose that two i-labeled edges complete configuration C 3 with |P 2 | = k 1 and |P 3 | = k 2 . Let w denote the colliding node of P 2 and P 3 . (Namely, w = e(P 2 ) = e(P 3 ).) If the two i-labeled edges have the same sign, then for some possible value z ∈ {0, 1} n for w R , we have w ∈ V 1
If the two i-labeled edges have opposite signs, then we have w = e(P 1 ) = e(P 2 ) ∈ V 2
we have
We have the following proposition, which is easy to prove, but useful throughout the security analysis.
Proposition 3. For fixed u, v ∈ {0, 1} 2n , the probability that the i-th query-response cycle
By Propositions 2, 3 and inequality (3), the only remaining problem for the security proof is to upper bound the size of the auxiliary subsets, which is equivalent to upper bounding the number of possible start/end nodes for a certain "collision-completing edge".
Bounding the start/end nodes of collision-completing edges Proposition 4.
For an integer a > 1, let Mult(a) denote the event that a multiset {Z i , Z i σ : 1 ≤ i ≤ q} has an element of multiplicity > a. Then we have
Furthermore, for any k ≥ 0 and w ∈ {0, 1} 2n , event ¬Mult(a) implies |U 0 k (w)| ≤ a k .
Proof. Fix z ∈ {0, 1} n . The probability that z has multiplicity greater than a in the multiset
Inequality (4) follows since z is chosen from a set of size N .
If u ∈ U 0 k (w) for some w, then there would exist a path Proposition 5. For α ∈ {1, 2}, k ≥ 0 and M > 0, let U α k (M ) denote the event that |U α k (z 1 , z 2 )| > M for some z 1 , z 2 ∈ {0, 1} n . Then for α ∈ {1, 2} and d = 2m + 1 > a > 0, we have
where
Therefore the proposition holds for k = 0. Now we will assume event α=1,2 0≤j<k
for k ≥ 1 and estimate the probability of U 1 k (d k ) on this condition. The probability of U 2 k (d k ) can be analyzed similarly. Our estimation consists of the following three steps.
Step 1. We fix z 1 , z 2 ∈ {0, 1} n , and then upper bound the probability, denoted p, that ∆ i increases |U 1 k (z 1 , z 2 )| (at least by one). First, we estimate the probability, denoted p 1 , that ∆ i completes a path
such that u L = z 1 and v R = z 2 by contributing a single edge in P. 
Next, we estimate the probability, denoted p 2 , that ∆ i completes a path P
such that u L = z 1 and v R = z 2 by contributing at least two edges in P (assuming k ≥ 2). 
and hence
Step 2. For any z 1 , z 2 ∈ {0, 1} n , the number of cycles that increase |U 1 k (z 1 , z 2 )| is not greater than m except with probability
Step 3. We estimate the maximum increment that a single cycle ∆ i can make in |U 1 k (z 1 , z 2 )| for fixed values z 1 and z 2 . Any node that is newly added to U 1 k (z 1 , z 2 ) by ∆ i is associated with a path P such that |P| = k, s(P) L = z 1 and e(P) R = z 2 . This path (not necessarily unique) consists of edges labeled ≤ i and certainly contains at least one i-labeled edge. Among the end nodes added by ∆ i , the number of nodes whose corresponding path has u[s] → u[s + 1] as the nearest i-labeled edge to the end node would be at most 2d k−s−1 since such nodes should be contained in either
. Therefore, the total increment made by ∆ i is bounded by
From
Step 2 and Step 3, we conclude that
except with probability P . By (6), we obtain inequality (5).
Proposition 6. For k 2 ≥ k 1 such that k = k 1 + k 2 > 0 and M > 0, define the following events.
Then for α ∈ {1, 2} and integers d = 2m + 1 > a > 0, we have
Proof. We begin with assuming event
Here we give a proof only for α = 2, while the other case can be proved similarly. Our proof consists of the following three steps as the previous proposition.
Step 1. We fix z 1 , z 2 ∈ {0, 1} n , and then upper bound the probability, denoted p, that ∆ i increases |V 2
(z 1 , z 2 )| (at least by one). First, we estimate the probability, denoted p 1 , that ∆ i completes a pair of irreducible colliding paths
such that u R + θv L = z 1 and w R = z 2 , by contributing a single edge in P 
For the case where the single edge
is contained in P 2 , we fix z * ∈ {0, 1} n as the value of w L . Then we can determine w = z * ||z 2 . Once w is fixed, we have v[t + 1] ∈ U 0 k 2 −t−1 (w) and u ∈ U 0
Next, we estimate the probability, denoted p 2 , that ∆ i completes a pair of irreducible colliding paths of form (9) by contributing either at least two edges in P 1 or at least two edges in P 2 . The estimation of p 2 is similar to Proposition 5, so we have
Finally, we estimate the probability, denoted p 3 , that ∆ i completes a pair of irreducible colliding paths of form (9) by contributing exactly two edges, one from P 1 and the other from For the case where the two i-labeled edge have the same sign, fix z * ∈ {0, 1} n as the value of
Therefore the probability p + 3 that two edges of the same sign, one from P 1 and the other from P 2 , complete configuration (9) is at most
For the case where the two i-labeled edge have opposite signs, fix z * ∈ {0, 1} n as the value of w L . Then we have w = z * ||z 2 , u[s
, the probability p − 3 that two edges of opposite signs complete configuration (9) is estimated by
To summarize, we have
Step 2. For any z 1 , z 2 ∈ {0, 1} n , the number of cycles that increase |V 1
| is not greater than m except with probability
Step 3. With the same analysis as Proposition 5, the maximum increment that a single cycle ∆ i can make in |V 1
(z 1 , z 2 )| for fixed values z 1 and z 2 is upper bounded by
From
Step 2 and Step 3, we conclude that |V 1
except with probability P . By (10), we obtain inequality (8).
Proof. It is easy to prove
Therefore we assume event
for k > 1 and follow the argument used in the previous propositions.
Step 1. We fix z ∈ {0, 1} n , and then upper bound the probability, denoted p, that ∆ i increases |W k 1 ,k 2 (z)| (at least by one). First, we estimate the probability, denoted p 1 , that ∆ i completes a pair of irreducible colliding paths
such that w R = z, by contributing a single edge in
. Applying a similar argument to the case where the single edge is contained in P 2 , we have
Next, the probability that ∆ i completes a pair of irreducible colliding paths of form (12) by contributing either at least two edges in P 1 or at least two edges in P 2 is estimated by
using the same analysis as Proposition 6. Also, the probability that ∆ i completes a pair of irreducible colliding paths of form (12) by contributing exactly two edges, one from P 1 and the other from P 2 is estimated by
Step 2. For any z ∈ {0, 1} n , the number of cycles that increase |W k 1 ,k 2 (z)| is not greater than mc k N/d k 2 except with probability
Step 3. With the same analysis as Proposition 5, the maximum increment that a single cycle ∆ i can make in |W k 1 ,k 2 (z)| for a fixed z is upper bounded by
Step 2 and
Step 3, we conclude that
= c k N except with probability P . By (13), we obtain inequality (11) .
Proof. This proof uses Markov's inequality, so we begin with definition of certain random variables. For each (z, i) ∈ {0, 1} n × {1, . . . , q}, we define a random variable X z,i , where X z,i (Q ∆ ) = 1 if
1. there exist a pair of irreducible colliding paths
such that w R = z and max{s 1 , . . . , s k 1 , t 1 , . . . , t k 2 } = i, 2. the following predicate is true:
We also define X = z∈{0,1} n 1≤i≤q X z,i .
First, we upper bound the expected value E(X). We begin with upper bounding E(X z,i ) for a fixed pair (z, i). In fact, E(X z,i ) is upper bounded by the probability that the i-th cycle ∆ i completes a pair of of irreducible colliding paths of form (14) such that w R = z under the condition D. The analysis of this probability is exactly the same as Proposition 7. Namely,
Therefore, we have
By Markov's inequality, we have
Since each (z, i) increases the size of W *
at most by
Putting the Pieces Together
Theorem 9. Let l ≥ 2, d = 2m + 1 > a > 0, M > 0 and 2q/N ≤ c < 1. Then for any modified adversary B that recordsuery-response cycles,
Then we have
Example 2 Let l = 2. Then we decompose Ex as follows.
where we are omitting predicates
Now we can upper bound the probability of each term in the righthand side of the above implication by using Proposition 5, 6, 7 and 8.
Back to the proof, since C 0 =⇒ Ex, we have
In order to upper bound Pr [C * 1 ∧ ¬Ex], we fix 1 ≤ i ≤ q, and count the number of possible nodes u satisfying the first condition appearing in the description of event C * 1 in Proposition 2 and the number of possible nodes v satisfying the second condition. Without the occurrence of event Ex, they are upper bounded by
respectively. For a fixed pair of u and v, the probability that the i-th query-response cycle ∆ i generates an edge from u to v is at most 2/(N ) 2 by Proposition 3. Therefore we have
Similarly, we can prove
Therefore, by inequality (15), we have
which completes the proof.
Example 3 Let l = 3, d = 2m + 1 > a > 0, M > 0 and 2q/N ≤ c < 1. Then by Theorem 9 and using the constants S 1 , S 2 , S 3 , S 4 from Let N = 2 128 . Given the query complexity q, we can optimize the upper bound by carefully choosing the parameters a, m, M and c. As a result, we can obtain Table 2 comparing the collision resistance of MDC-2 and MJH.
Asymptotic Result
For N = 2 n and l ≥ 2, let q = N If we regard the parameter l as a constant, then each term of the above upper bound is analyzed as follows.
1. 
5.
Here C i , i = 1, . . . , 13, are certain constants represented as functions of l. It is easy to show that each term converges to zero as N goes to infinity. Given > 0, we can take the parameter l so that inequality N 1− < N l l+1 / log N holds for sufficiently large N . Therefore, we can conclude that the MJH hash function is asymptotically collision resistant up to O(N 1− ) query complexity for any > 0.
